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ABSTRACT 
Social norms are mixtures of extralegal and legal principles. The International 
Court of Justice‟ in The Hague‟s (ICJ) adjudication subtracts normative structures from 
different sources, moral, ethical, religious etc. dogmas amplifying its case law. The 
failing Israel-Palestine reconciliation that results from “power asymmetries” and 
“supreme emergency exception”, illustrates how absence of concomitant social norms 
fosters extremists destined to wage war. War is not the answer to the two-state talks‟ 
collapse but civilized methods of dispute settlement. Neither negotiations nor “Gods 
divine plan” for Jews has solved the Israel-Palestine boundary conflict. Prayers, 
pronouncements etc. may ease tensions, but has failed to bring peace. Since territorial 
demarcation is a secular event, religious leaders should request ICJ adjudication. Other 
peaceful mechanisms, i.a. ICJ-justification, is however imminent. The courts frames 
are well-known legal and extralegal principles i.a. religious morals incorporated into 
general principles of law. Thus, i.a. the World Council of Religious Leaders (WCRL) 
should trust that ICJ not only propels “world peace” but also the “work of the United 
Nations (UN) in our common quest for peace”. Such attainments assume Council‟s 
diplomatic pressure on Security Council (SC). 
   
Keywords: ICJ-justification, cross-cultural and religious norms, practical rationality-
theory, Israel-Palestine negotiation failure. 
 
I. The topics at issue, backdrop and puzzles 
 
This article addresses the following issue. The implication of religious-morals and 
other social-, non-codified rules in the International Court of Justice in The Hague‟s 
(ICJ) case law. A possible platform for narrowing the gap between legal- and extra-
legal norms is the WCRL‟, World Council of Churches or other universal religious 
societies‟ (hereinafter “Councils” or “World Councils”) subscription to the UN Charter 
basic principles (Chapter II). Possibly, these Councils should take action to challenge 
i.a. the Israel-Palestinian negotiations “deadlock”. While I doubt that prayers, kerygma, 
worship, pronouncements, etc. are adequate, I am optimistic about other means such as 
political initiatives and diplomatic leadership.  
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My aim is to bridge the gap between “ideal theory focusing on the moral 
foundations of laws and policies” and legal “realistic or pragmatic approach”,
1
 that is 
exemplified by court justification i.e. «a theory of justice that can serve as the basis of 
practical reasoning»,
2
 and which is elucidated in “the discourse model”.
3
 We here 
move into more or less “virgin territory” that under certain circumstances practices 
“Order without law”,
4
 without ending up in the state of chaos. 
Chapter III reveal the non-self-contained system of international law. The ICJ and 
predecessor, Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) case law reveal a 
system of borrowing from ethical-, moral- and religious norm-structures. Thus, 
Councils should trust ICJ unbiased interpretation and application of law on facts. Since 
most civilized nations appeal to courts as the ultimate solution, the conundrum is what 
is so special with the Israel-Palestine delimitation conflict deferring to bring the case to 
ICJ?  
 
II. World Councils and United Nation’s quest for peace  
“Behold, I send you out as sheep in the midst of wolves. Therefore be wise as 
serpents and harmless as doves”. Matthew 10:5 
What is to expect from World Council considering their long-standing and compelling 
strive for peace?  My answer is; a reliable mediator that advances the Isaiah II.4 
message; “Nation shall not lift up sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war 
anymore”. This thesis has massive support; “the Lord wishes to spread His kingdom … 
of justice, love and peace”.
5
  Politicians has since long
6
 been affiliate with the need for 
“an adequate body of international law which can be administered so as to secure 
justice … Without law power is despotism”.
7
 Thus, what is a better option for Councils 
as initiating- and implementing rule of law. 
I anticipate that most denominations trust ICJ‟s balanced and just decision to settle 
the delimitation dispute. Is the pressure from interfaith alliances‟ on directly and 
indirectly involved national states a doorway to peace? The basis for my position is this 
declaration: 
"As religious and spiritual leaders of the world forming the WCRL, we believe 
that religion can serve as a positive force for achieving world peace that 
conflicts among religious and spiritual groups are avoidable, and that harmony 
amongst them is to be consistently promoted through active discussions and 
dialogues … 
WITH THESE ENDS IN VIEW, the World Council of Religious Leaders is 
formed … to strengthen the United Nations and other international and national 
organizations that are dedicated to promoting world peace, harmony, tolerance, 




As envisaged (Chapter III), religious morality is dominant extralegal norms 
generating non-conventional international law. Thus, most professions of faith may 
easily approve the ICJ-solution as an instrument of hope, advancing “the message of 
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peace [that] may enter the world”. World-Councils subscribe – not only to the 
accomplishment of “world peace … among religious and spiritual groups” – but to “… 
promoting world peace”.
9
   
While the results of prayers etc. seems futile, Councils diplomatic initiative to 
advance ICJ-adjudication in the Israel-Palestine delimitation-dispute, hits virgin soil 
and is ripe for examining. My hypothesis is that ICJ is well suited to deal with this 
conflicts as illustrated by numerous decisions on the topic, see i.a. Cameroon vs. 
Nigeria, 2002,
 10
 with further references. 
  The ICJ transformation of religious moral into general principles of law brings 
ICJ into the center of events. Scripture has a place in decision-making
11
 of which ICJ 
adjudication is one important instance. Basis is Habermas‟ theory on practical 
rationality, “the discourse model”, connects the theory of social action to discourse 
ethics in an effort to reach the ultimate objective of “right or just” as interpreted in 
international politics.
12
   
The effects of the Councils‟ role have not reached the level of expectations due to 
the meager outcome. Because present measures do not fulfill its purpose, Councils 
should try new means. Perhaps Councils‟ diplomatic initiative could unshackle the 
Gordian knot of the Israel-Palestine stalemate. Crucial to the successful fulfillment of 
this pragmatic toil, is a critical debate and free communication in real democratic 
situations.
13
 Since “Persons of high moral character” form the ICJ-court,
14
 these moral 
agents welcomes applied norms as universal: “what sort of world he would create 
under the guidance of practical reason… a world into which, moreover, he would 
place himself as a member”.
15
  
While pragmatic thinking, mutual recognition, contradiction etc. is part of practical 
reasoning, it is insufficient in itself.  Decision-making related to the Israeli-Palestinian 
puzzle imply impartial views of norms application to conflicting interests.  As 
Habermas states, every beneficial solution includes not only the ethically wise, but also 
morally correct. Immanuel Kant would have added; it is a question of religion within 
the limits of practical reason.
16
 In this sense, too the Habermas theory closely connects 
to theology. 
 Pope avowals make little awareness; i.a. we “cannot expect anything greater … 
from the new Vicar of Christ than … he will strive with all his might to propagate the 
doctrine of the Gospel among all men, and that he will bring peoples together in a spirit 
of true peace and strengthen them therein". Albeit defensive war is no legally valid 
option, it arose in 1967.
17
 I thus claim that, Councils‟ mediator-role is vital; cf. “the 
great commission”,
18
 and a strong incentive for action: As religious morals is an 
important part of the general principles of law, this very fact should prompt Councils – 
through consular channels – to advance ICJ-adjudication. One cannot rule out the 
likelihood of war if conflicts remain unsettled. Since UN-Charter Articles 36.3 and 
37.2 call for court justification, the obvious question is, why has the “relentless logic, 
induced to plead their causes at the bar”
19
 slipped the minds of i.a. Palestinian-Israeli 
antagonists?  
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III. ICJ-justification: converting extralegal- to legal rules  
 
“It is not just the balance of power that provides order and stability and keeps anarchy 




As people “may supplement, and indeed preempt, the state‟s rules with rules of 
their own”,
21
 national states may subscribe to a similar ideology: International case law 
ensues intertwined structures of ethical, religious and moral dogmas, as law. While 
Christian Scripture dominated before the 1890s, Islam, Hindu and Buddhist Scriptures 
gradually gained ground (Sec. C-E).
22
    
Why should the World-Councils support ICJ-justification as the ultimate solution 
to the delimitation-puzzle? The court‟s pragmatism results from applying international 
law correctly interpreted to obtain individual to the situation adaptive, solutions. As 
revealed in this article religious morals play a vital role in ICJ justification. The courts 
main endeavor is to obtain a delimitation-line; “in order to achieve an equitable 
result”
23
 between Israel and Palestine.   
A. The influx of extralegal norms in UN general provisions 
“Statements about law are systemically relativized, but the systems in question are 
partially open. It would be a mistake to try to close these systems – it would be a 
theoretical and practical mistake. The theoretical mistake is made by legal positivism 
which takes norms as “given in advance”, the transformation from teleology to 
normativity being for it final … and complete”.
24
 
Member States (MS) should abide by the UN-Charter preamble; “to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be maintained”. The UN consider that UN-
MS is liable to actively construe working conditions that advance not only legal- but 
also extralegal obligations; “other sources”. Thus, conventional law incorporates 
extralegal norms by references to such norms. 
Another illustration is Charter Article 1. “The Purposes of the United Nations 
are … to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law …” Similarly the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, Article 38 (2): “shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex 
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto”. The Latin phrase means “equity law” 
and is extralegal principles of justice. 
These intertwined norms are referential frames – often called “preeminent good”
25
  
– upon which duties derive and subsequently an action evaluates as exemplary if 
according to “law and right”, or “right or just”. Some authors say that the distinction 
between a legal obligation and a moral duty goes between obligations exposing legal 
rights and those 
“Which do not give birth to any right? I think it will be found that this distinction 
exactly coincides with that which exists between justice and the other obligations 
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of morality […] Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and 
wrong not to do, but which some individual can claim from us as his moral right. 
No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not 
morally bound to practice those virtues towards any given individual”.
26
  
B. UN special provisions – emphasizing the Israel-Palestine conflict  
“They rightly single out the kernel of the League, the so-called “moratorium clauses,” 
by the action of which the nations bind themselves not to go to war till time has been 
allowed for the submission of the dispute to arbitration.” Sir Geoffrey Butler
27
   
This section introduces UN-decisions addressing the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
These provisions exhibit the legal frame upon which a possible ICJ-adjudication takes 
place. The section C-E forthcoming case law is supplementing the Section A and B 
codifications. 
United Nations (GA) Res.181 (1947) calls for the partitioning of Palestine into 
two states; one Jewish and one Arab. During the years, a long list of both SC and 
GA-resolutions supplement the Res. 181-platform. 
The second move came by the SC confirmation of the proxy of a cease-fire agreement 
by the armistice pursuant to SC Res.50 and SC Res.54 of May 29 and July 15, 1948. 
Neither one of the resolutions signals any change of directions of politics, nor does 
either one mention Res.181. These subsequent resolutions thus supplement Res. 181 
and do not replace it. 
The SC reference to Res.194/1948 requires the parties to resolve conflicts through 
either bilateral effort or mediation, in case the UN Conciliation Board, which was set 
up especially for the parties to take advantage of it. Res. 194 does not invalidate 
Res.181.  On the contrary, GA Res.194 refers to GA Res.186 (S-2), which in turn 
refers to Res.181 (III). GA Res. 194 makes only one change to Res.181:  it abolishes 
the Palestine Commission. Thus, the viable interpretation is that the rest of the 
resolution remains intact and is valid. Clearly, a small group of MS cannot abandon a 
UN decision, neither in a formal, legal sense, nor explicitly or tacitly. 
SC decided subsequent resolutions, 242(1967) and 338(1973). The Charter does 
not permit the SC to deviate from GA-decisions, as set forth in numerous provisions of 
Chapter II of the UN Charter, Art.4, para.2; Art.5; and Art.6. The SC is superior to the 
GA only in instances of concrete and acute disputes under the direct Charter power, 
grants provided in Charter Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. Article 24.2 sets this forth 
explicitly. Since the SC is not entitled to derogate from Res.181, SC cannot repeal or 
modify it. 
UN does not demand that a MS bring a dispute before the court, nor is a MS 
required to abide by the ICJ‟s decisions in cases to which it is not a party. Pursuant to 
ICJ Statute Article 36.2, a MS “may at any time declare” that it recognizes the court‟s 
jurisdiction in a certain case: "The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis 
of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases”.
28
 Israel claims that the ICJ‟s advisory 
opinions are limited to the contentious cases. “Because the request [on the construction 
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of the wall] concerns a contentious matter between Israel and Palestine, in respect of 
which Israel has not consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction,” Israel claims that 
the ICJ overstepped its jurisdiction.
29
 This claim is baseless, c.f.: “The consent of 
States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious 
cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even where the 




Because Palestine is not yet a MS to the UN, it is per se excluded from taking part 
in a future dispute settlement before the ICJ (Art. 34.1). Article 93.1 of Charter does 
not provide Palestine with ipso facto membership in the ICJ Statute. Its unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (1988) may help it to bypass this roadblock, however. 
Thus, GA should recognize Palestine as MS to bring its boundary dispute before the 
ICJ. 
In any case, if the UN decides to have the ICJ solve the dispute, formalistic hurdles 
will not defeat its decision. First, the ICJ may provide “advisory opinions” pursuant to 
its advisory jurisdiction in arts. 65-68 of the ICJ Statute and resolution.
31 
Instead, the 
disputants could refer the case to an arbitrational Court to solve what the “unwilling 
men” cannot. This is what Israel and Palestine agreed to do: “the parties repeatedly 
agreed that these issues are to be settled by negotiation, with the possibility of an 
agreement that recourse could be had to arbitration”.
32
 
Optional solutions have failed. The creation and subsequent disintegration of the 
“Conciliation Commission”
33
 and the “United Nations Mediator on Palestine” (GA 
Res. 186, S-2), both of which were dysfunctional, makes this evident. Only compulsory 
dispute settlement remains. Res.181 imposes a duty on Israel to participate in a dispute 
settlement before the ICJ. “Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation 
of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of the either party, to the 




As Res.181 Part II envisages, boundaries are within the meaning of “any dispute”. 
One position is that Israel is legally bound to engage in ICJ dispute settlement 
according to Res.181. Because of Israel‟s past position, I would argue, it has a present 
duty to recognize future ICJ decisions. This position is not unanimous, however.
35
 
The disputants might agree that Res.181 is insufficient to impose legally binding 
obligations on MS to act.
36
  Even if that is true, MS are not the only parties involved.  
First, the SC has clearly defined duties: “The Security Council [is asked to] “take the 
necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation”.
37
 Secondly, 
Israel has specific responsibilities. Res.181 preceded Israel‟s Declaration of 
Independence and application for UN membership. That is not all. The Israel 
application for UN membership explicitly stated that Res.181 is one of the foundations 
of its right to exist as a nation and is part of Israel‟s basic laws.  Israel was established 
“by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the Resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly”. The “Resolution” referenced is Res.181. However, 
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the Israeli tribute of Res.181 as a core legal source goes even further. As case law 
reveals the Israeli Supreme court has construed Knesset acts and language relying on 
Res.181.
38
   
Thus, Israel has arguably acquiesced in its obligation to obey legal decisions 
relevant to Res.181, in casu the draft Israeli-Palestine boundary (Part III). “The right of 
the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country… was recognized … in the 
Mandate of the League of Nations.” The political goodwill was not the one and only 
foothold for the declaration because it expressly referenced its legal obligations 
outlined in Res.181:  
“the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution [Res.181] calling 
for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly 
required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary 
on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by 




Having benefited from Res.181 Israel subsequently rejects it,
40
 legally and morally.
41
 
Israel‟s position appears premised on the further claim that international rules have 
slipped into desuetude due to its neglect. Is this a valid position?  
The legal basis for the two-state solution is two-fold.  First, it provides for the 
succession of power from the mandatory state – Great Britain – to the Independent 
Arab and Jewish States.  Second, it embodies the UN plan for peaceful coexistence. 
Res.181 lists all conditions for the establishment of the nation states. As I shall 
demonstrate, the UN mandate provisions and Res.181 frame the jurisdiction. The UK 
mandate that later became the UN mandate was granted by the League of Nations.   
”The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, 
administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the 
Jewish national home … and the development of self-governing institutions, and 
also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of 
Palestine, irrespective of race and religion”.
42
 
The mandatory‟s duty was to transfer its sovereignty to the UN Commission, no 
later than August 1, 1948, which was the British termination date for the League of 
Nations mandate (Res.181, Part I A, §1). “The administration of Palestine shall, as the 
mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the 
Commission.” (Part I. B §2.). The final goal was to create an Israeli and Palestine 
“Economic Union” (Part I. D).
43
 
The two-state solution provides for Freedom of Transit and Visit (GA 
Res.181:1D), Jerusalem included. (GA Res.181:III.A.12e) Arabs living in Israel have 
the right to become Israeli citizens and to “enjoy full civil and political rights” 
thereunder (GA Res.181:1C,3.1). “The Provisional Council of Government of each 
State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit” 
(I.D). Its leading principles are open access to markets. Israel declared to codify choice 
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of language, either Hebrew or Arabic, in private conversations, trade, religion and 
public meetings (Israeli Declaration, C, 2).  
Israel cannot expropriate land owned by Arabs, and vice-versa for State of 
Palestine re Jewish possessions, unless done for “public purposes”, if duly 
compensated (Res.181, Ch.2.9). 
Neither Israel nor Palestine may unilaterally amend Res.181 (Chapter 4, Part 1,  
Section C). The language is definite. “The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 [Holy Places, 
Religious Buildings and Sites, Religious and Minority Rights] of the declaration shall 
be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in 
them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations.”  Thus, only 
the GA can repeal or amend the following rights: The right to use native language 
(Chapter 2 § 8). The right to establish and attend schools that use Arabic as language 
(§7). Full compensation for expropriated land (§9). The unfettered right to religious life 
(§5). The right to be governed by own family law with respect to family life, rules and 
minority interests (§4). Equality under the law (§3). No discrimination based on 
religion, race, language or sex (§2); and freedom of conscience and religious freedom 
(§1). 
The regime of Holy Places, grants the Governor of Jerusalem the right to decide 
whether Israeli laws governing holy places and cites comply with Res.181 and 194 
duties . Cf. his right to decide “disputes which may arise between the different religious 
communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, 
buildings and sites” (GA Res.181, III.C:14c). 
The lesson learned from the UN follow-up on the Israel-Palestine puzzle is that 
decisions built on good intentions fails if the antagonists subscribe to weaponry and 
military force, due to “power asymmetries” and “supreme emergency exception”. 
Oslo Accords nearly solved the Res.181 remaining disputes. However, an Israeli 
nationalist assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin after signing the Accord. Thus, 
«messianic zealotry» overruled the practical rationality of half way solution or other 
grand bargains. 
 
C. ICJ case law (1): law ex tunc or ex nunc – positivism versus judicial 
legislation 
The focus in the following sections is on the role of ICJ case law. The ICJ 
decision-making builds on a three-pillar platform: First, affirming the main purpose 
of the law, which is nothing but the art of being followed. Second; interpreting 
codifications or conventional law the purpose of which is to correct the living fabric 
of life to obtain “justice”. Third; the objective of courts justification is to forwarding 
a “right or just” decision to the parties involved. If the result turns out unjust, the 
application and/or interpretation are wrong. 
My position is that the legal system is complete, maintaining norms embracing 
every possible conflict, which subsequently generates legal solutions. Sources of law is 
both written, conventional law, and unwritten; general principles of law and customary 
Burjis: Vol 7, Issue 2          The Transformation of Extralegal Principles……..       July-December, 2020 
 
 
law. ICJ cannot refuse to adjudicate. ICJ is law-abiding, the obligation of which is to 
apply international law in dispute settlement. One position is to renounce from “judicial 
legislation”,
44
 Judge Rosalyn Higgins, though, is at variance stating that „the judge‟s 
role is …to decide which of two… norms is applicable … As these rules indubitably 
exist, there can be no question of judicial legislation‟
45
. Judge Higgins mentions 
existing norms, which refers to the notion of “general principle of equity”, and written 
and unwritten law, combined. I side with Higgins offsetting Vereshchtin’s strong 
positivist declaration,
 
due to the fact that international law comprises of more than 
conventional law – in casu of customary- as well as general principles of law. 
This no-loop-hole position builds on the understanding that the relevant sources of 
law exists ex tunc, ready to revive by an ICJ judgment‟s ratio decidendi. As of this 
practice, international law reveals the amalgamation of legal- and extralegal norms (see 
in the continuation) as valid legal sources at the time of justification. The ICJ apply 
these sources of law, ICJ does not conceive the law ex nunc. 
Another prerequisite is the transformation of practices into norms, i.e. customary 
law. It illustrates “Die Normative Kraft des faktischen”.
46
 Despite practices vital role in 
the composition of customary laws, the mere de facto usage is insufficient. Valid 
customary laws require that “not only must the acts concern "amount to a settled 
practice", but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis. Either 
the States taking such action or other States in a position to react must have behaved 
so that their conduct is "evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”.
47
 
To meet these prerequisites the extralegal- and legal norms are indistinguishable – 
or at least harmonized. Some scholars contest this position, i.e. “the possibility of a 
rational transformation of teleology into normativity”.
48
 I refrain from taking position 
on this issue. 
Today, ICJ case law addresses not only Christian nations, but also the international 
societies of states in toto.
49
 Since the old “Family of Nations” until early 19-hundred, 
consisted of Christian nations only, Christian Scripture originally served the purpose of 
filling in the loopholes of law.  
“The old Christian States of Western Europe are the original members of the 
Family of Nations, because the Law of Nations grew up gradually between them 
through custom and treaties… With the reception of the Turkish Empire into the 




Concomitantly to the increased group of legal subjects, Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic 
Scriptures – i.a. norms like Noble Eightfold Path, the Five Pillars etc. – paved their 
way into the ICJ courtroom. Thus, the platform for the modern international society of 
states now fully adjusts to religious-moral norms. Studies in legal history make this 
extended reach clear. 
This extended out-reach jurisdictione ratione personae – from the “Family of 
Nations” to the “International Society of States” – forces ICJ to change focus, from the 
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advancing of basic Christian dogmas – mostly – to all-embracing adaptation to 
“elementary considerations of humanity”.
51
 The “World law”
52
 and “cosmopolitan 
principles of law”
53
 typifies the current international legal regime. The succeeding texts 
display these transformation mechanics and the material content of these principles, 
which – incorporated into international customary law or general principles of law– 
address all the international societies of states. 
 
D. ICJ case law (2): Filling the lacunas – no sign of contra legem “takeover”  
The starting point is the non-self-contained system of international law. The topic 
for discussion in this section is “the process by which the law takes in, assimilates and 
uses matter from without and by so doing gathers the energy for its own growth”,
54
 i.e. 
if not taking it all in “lock, stock and barrel”,
 55
 so at least by subtracting an overall 
principle from the original legal source.  
The salient point is whether the existence of legal rule is premature – a de 
scentential ferenda – until the court decision, in which case ICJ does not construe the 
norm, but only pick up on a normative, non-written structure that is already “there”, 
followed by the most national states. It is however the judgment that confirms and 
defines the norms‟ material content. Thus, the ICJ adjudication does not limit itself to 
incorporating extralegal rules. As stated by ICJ case law, domestic law may fill inn 
lacunas : 
“International law is called upon to recognize institutions of municipal law… This 
does not … imply drawing any analogy… all it means is that international law has 
had to recognize the corporate entity as an institution created by states in a domain 
essentially within their domestic jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever 
legal issues arise concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment of 
companies and shareholders, as to which rights international law has not 
established its own rules, it has to refer to relevant rules of municipal law”.
56
 
Besides domestic law GA-decisions reflects the link between UN provisions and 
religion:  
“Freedom of religion should contribute to the attainment of the goals of world 
peace, social justice, and friendship among peoples . . . The use of religion or 
belief for ends inconsistent with the Charter of the U.N. and the purpose and 
principles of the present declaration is inadmissible. . .”
57
   
Thus, religion endorses the UN ultimate goal of world peace.
58
  This is also verified by 
the “Dogmatic Constitution on the Church” claiming that the: 
"laity also by their combined efforts remedy the customs and conditions of the 
world, if they are an inducement to sin, so that they all may be conformed to the 
norms of justice and may favor the practice of virtue rather than hinder it. By so 
doing they will imbue culture and human activity with genuine moral values; they 
will better prepare the field of the world for the seed of the Word of God; and at 
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the same time they will open wider the doors of the denomination by which the 
message of peace may enter the world”.
59
  
This basic text provides that laypeople‟s effort is to contribute to customs and 
conditions that coincide “to the norms of justice".
60
 Thus, UN provisions connect to 
extralegal norms and amplifies a perception of “Christ as the Head of humanity,
61 
the 
creator of divine universal law
62
 and the categorical imperative.
63
 Through UN-
codification and ICJ-justification, an amalgamation of positive law, justice, virtue, and 
intertwined norms, will appear under the concept of de lege lata.   
    
E. ICJ case law (3):  the extralegal norms’ transformation – some 
illustrations 
 Could ICJ wipe out the Israel-Palestine conflict? Is case law revealing 
principles of universal law?  To succeed in settling disputes mediators should 
contribute with the very best of intention, knowledge and skills.
64
 What more is 
needed?  
 Universal divine law – lex naturalis
65
 – protects humanity. Modern natural law 
is however not static but dynamic; fully linked to the living fabric of life. As 
professor Klami states; “legal security (and foreseeability) and justice … are in the 
light of legal anthropology so universally valid values that they can without 
exaggeration be called Natural law”.
66
 
Thus, despite the stable hard core of the general principles of law, normative 
rudiments slightly changes according to facts.
67
 The “living fabric of life” tints the 
current natural law. 
To me “the law is not at any time completed but is always being modified in the 
process of judicial decision. Not only is the common law what the judges have made it 
but this is also largely the case with our statutory law, of which constitutional law is a 
special instance”.
68
  Illustrations of basic principles is found in holy books; i.a. The 
Golden Rule. Thus; Aspirations, religious understandings, cultural, moral and legal 
attitudes are linked. If antagonists and mediators subscribe to the principle of 
reciprocity and prohibiting double standards, I expect that harmony and peace will 
come to humanity. Often this normative structure denotes as equity law, 
“righteousness” or “justice”. Since the ICJ is a world court, it neither can – nor de 
facto do – subscribe to Christian dogmas only. Other Scriptures or divine belief often 
shares identical exigencies. I.a. the holiness of life; the Right to life (Hinduism), 
requirements to social life; i.a. be tolerant: (The Coran), reject to acquire others 
belongings (The Bible), be sympathetic to, have sympathy with (Confucius) or the 
subscription to “The golden rule”, do not do to others what you do not want others to 
do to you (Talmud). 
To avoid lacunas ICJ-justification “borrows” norms from domestic law. 
International law incorporates not only religious and moral principles, but notice 
domestic law as well. “International law recruited … many of its rules and institutions 
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from private systems of law. …The way in which International law borrows from the 
source is not by means of importing private law institutions. …  The true view … is to 
regard any features or terminology which is reminiscent of the rules … of private law 




Extralegal norms broadly recognized, play a similar role. A rather common 
understanding is that parties referring a case to the court, does not intend to have a non 
liquet (what the law is, is unclear) in return.
70
 Clearly ICJ‟s responsibility is “to 
confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality”, which subsequently 
ranks as recognized general principles of international law.
71
 
To the influx of Scriptures: The principles of no-double-standards and the process 
of mutual acknowledgment are amid basic rules i.e. the religious dogma of “do onto 
others that you would like others do onto you”.
72
 The international the societies of 
states meet similar dogmas in non-Christian religious faiths, i.a. the Golden rule as 
found not only in Talmud but also in Buddhism, which according to Buddhist scripture 
belongs to the “Four Noble Truths”. 
“If people want to live an ultimately happy life with no harms toward them at all, 




The “half-way-solution” relates closely to the no-double-standard: “Buddhism 
postulates the principle of Middle Way as a criterion in making decisions on all levels 
of activities and encourages frugality as a positive virtue”.
74
 Other connections occur: 
The principle of equity goes hand-in-hand with the ban on double standards. The 
equity position is the infallible principle of good faith.  
“One of the basic principles governing… legal obligations… [is] the principle of 
good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation … Just 
as the rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so 




Good faith renounces the “race towards the bottom”: “if one seeks retribution for 
vengeance through vengeance, the chain can never be broken”.
76
 We therefore cannot 
subscribe to nothing but the game of “mutual reliable players” at the international 
stage. 
The principle of “pacta sunt servanda” is fundamental in international relations. It 
is well known since ancient time; i.e. the Athenian Constitution, and even the older 
Code of Hammurabi, both of which refer to the art of keeping promises, equality 
before the law and contractual obligations: “Thus might and right were yoked in 
harmony, since by the force of law I won my ends and kept my promise. Equal laws I 
gave to evil and to good, with even hand drawing straight justice for the lot of each”.
77
 
The art of keeping promises derives from divine universal law: “My covenant I 
will not break, nor alter the word that has gone out of My lips”.
78
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What is this norm‟s rationality? Well-functioning societies require faith the failing 
of which brings ruin to all. As Hannah Arendt told, promises are the “uniquely human 
way of ordering the future”.
79
 Foreseeability depends upon the likelihood of trust 
among fellow citizens. 
Case law not only confirms this principle, but also refines it. Thus, the“pacta sunt 
servanda” modifies, i.e. balances against the principle of “rebus sic stantibus” now 
part of international law.
80
 This illustrates the discretionary power and the strengths of 
practical rationality. 
Thus – according to Habermas – a valid normative structure must satisfy all parties 
involved.  In a Grand-bargain situation, the two antagonists – i.e. Israel and Palestine – 
could neither of them, “pick the raisins out of the sausages”. 
 „Comity of nations‟ is a reality:
81
 It “is a political, not a legal, solution. Comity 
balancing leaves the effects principle intact as a basis of jurisdiction: it merely states 
that the court, having jurisdiction, should use its jurisdictional power wisely by 
answering the additional question of whether it should exercise such jurisdiction, based 
on a consideration of the legitimate concerns of foreign countries. Interest-balancing is 
rather a political- than a legal concept‟.
82
 
Decency and savoir-faire is the cornerstone of diplomatic notification. Tolerance 
and goodwill for other international players is among the bedrock principles of 
international relations.
83
 This platform materializes valid principles of law. Because 
states are „equal‟ (U.N. Charter, art. 1.2) and because „equality‟ directs international 
societies, double standards must capitulate. Comity and international law is closely 
connected; “there can be no doubt that many a rule that were comity only, is nowadays 
a rule of International Law”.
84
 Thus, comity principles praeter legem converts to infra 
legem.   
ICJ-premises establish equity principle as a basic stepping stone underlying 
international law:  “The Court‟s reasoning in fact amounted to an application of the 
principle that „He who seeks equity must do Equity‟, which is certainly in itself an 
equitable principle”.
85
 From this premises, these perceptions derive: First, the religious 
dogma of “Do onto others that you want others do onto you” incorporates into law. 
Secondly, Intra-state relations abandon double standards. However, this unbalanced 
situation cannot last:  
“The emergence of a polycentric global order represents a serious challenge to 
the post-1945 liberal international order not so much because the rising powers 
reject the ethical underpinnings of the order, but because the status quo powers 
have subjected others to while exempting themselves from „global‟ norms. The 
West is losing its ability to impose policy preferences, values and double 
standards on the rest”.
 86
 
Secondly, no state is “more equal” than others: “The Organization is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” (equal footing principle, 
Charter Article 2.1).  The SC deviates from this principle as “permanent members” 
(WWII- triumphant powers supplemented by Peoples Republic of China) enjoy 
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vetoing rights. Lack of basic change imperils universal stability because the “rising 
powers show increasing reluctance to take part in institutions and processes in which 
their voice and vote are sidelined and underrepresented”.
 87
 
The inter partes equality based relations find its root in Christian belief: “There is 
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for 
you are all one in Christ Jesus”.
88
 Similar faith is part of “Sikhism” which teaches all 
peoples‟ equality in the eyes of God. “Those who sing the Praises of the Lord… look 




Another justification platform is the principle of good faith: «One of the basic 
principles governing … legal obligations … [are] the principle of good faith. Trust and 
confidence are inherent in international co-operation … Just as the rule of pacta sunt 
servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of 
international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration”.
90
 
Thus, attaining peaceful cooperation between war-torn nations, extralegal norms 
come into play. Obtaining Israel and Palestine peaceful coexistence one cannot 
neglect the fact that God is peace and peace is the name of God‟s intention for the 




IV. Conclusion – paving the way to “the promised land”    
ICJ Case law incorporates extralegal principles, and it is room for it: ICJ is 
entitled, c.f. ICJ-Statute Article 38, to consider not only international treaties, but also 
case law, customary- and general principles of law, the origin of which is often 
religious moral.  As PCIJ told: «…a principle [of restitution in kind] which seems to 
be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals …» is binding upon the court.
92
 
As revealed in Chapter III, UN resolutions do however not capture the entire 
picture. Legal- and extralegal norms supplement conventional law and SC declarations. 
International law is not a self-contained system. ICJ deducts legal principles from 
extralegal sources filling in loopholes of law – lacunas – among which religious morals 
is leading. Thus, holy Scriptures are an international law basic structure – often called 
cosmopolitan principles of law.
 93
   
Given this religious-moral normative basis, the Councils support to UN 
peacekeeping instruments should generate interests in promoting an ICJ-solution that 
presumably ends the Israel-Palestine hostilities. Dr. Feinberg was right regarding the 
UN-MS competency; all nations were during British mandate, competent to bring 
Britain before ICJ if disregarded the Mandate over the Jewish National Home.
94
 The 
Palestine-Mandated Territory – was in a similar situation.  
The Councils have a special responsibility due to the religious-moral-principles‟ 
often dominant position in the ICJ decision-making.  ICJ, applying extralegal- and 
legal norms, may evade extremist Jewish-Muslim hostilities; finally generating peace 
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between these two war-torn peoples. ICJ-decision is the ultimate “scapegoat”. While 
often-condemned envoys escape the blame for non-acceptable compromises, the 
Councils‟ devotions may ease conflicts.
95
 Viable solutions cannot escape court 
justification. 
Which principles should bring a peaceful solution? We have seen that Councils 
subscribe to the “work of the United Nations (UN) in our common quest for peace”. 
Since ICJ is the conflict solving instrument of the UN and since ICJ‟s normative base 
include i.a. religious moral as incorporated in the general principles of law, I 
recommend that these Councils . In concreto;  I side with the 2008 General Assembly 
chair – and Nicaraguan catholic priest – Miguel Brockmann observing that the 
platform is “the United Nations act in order to implement UN Res.181 established in 
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